A mystery in Beijing: Who runs the military?
A mystery in Beijing: Who runs the military?
By David Lague
Copyright by The International Herald Tribune
Published: June 22, 2007
BEIJING: As China converts its growing economic power into military muscle, a lack of transparency and a habit of secrecy pose formidable challenges in assessing the country's long-term ambitions, according to defense experts.
For foreign governments and analysts monitoring the Chinese military, one of the biggest mysteries is who is actually in charge.
Nominally, President Hu Jintao, who is also chairman of the Central Military Commission, the top military command body, is head of the armed forces, but there is considerable doubt among experts about the extent of the authority that he and his fellow civilian leaders exert over the 2.3 million-strong People's Liberation Army.
"I think Hu Jintao is still facing some challenges from top generals," said Philip Yang, an expert on the Chinese military and a professor of international relations at the National Taiwan University. "Especially those with their own agenda from the different services and others with their own agenda and perceptions about changes in the outside world, particularly in East Asia."
For China's neighbors and regional military powers, including the United States, this lack of knowledge about China's military decision-making is frustrating attempts to understand a buildup that could shift the balance of power in Asia.
Some of China's broad goals are clear from military publications, the speeches of senior leaders and the type and numbers of new weapons deployed.
The army's primary mission remains preserving the Communist Party's monopoly on power and protecting senior leaders.
In addition to defending Chinese territory, most Chinese and foreign analysts agree that Beijing aims to build a force capable of enforcing its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
But China's current thinking about when force is justified or what perceived threats are driving its accumulation of firepower remains unclear for most foreign governments and analysts.
Some foreign military analysts believe that there is now considerable debate under way in the Chinese military about the role of pre-emptive force in some circumstances including the use of nuclear weapons.
The Bush administration has repeatedly complained about this lack of transparency and called for increased military exchanges with Beijing.
"The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision making and key capabilities supporting China's military modernization," the Pentagon said in its annual report on China's military power released late last month. "China's leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired end-states of the PLA's expanding military capabilities."
Senior Chinese officials reject suggestions that a stronger army poses a threat to regional stability and insist that defense spending is strictly tailored to the country's needs.
Some influential Chinese analysts say that the PLA has made considerable strides in recent years in explaining its doctrine and spending plans, and they expect this trend to continue.
But they argue that Washington's military support for Taiwan makes it impossible for China to reveal more about its strategic thinking and force structure.
"We have to keep certain secrets in order to have a war-fighting capability," said Shen Dingli, a security expert at Fudan University in Shanghai. "We can't let Taiwan and the U.S. know how we are going to defeat them if the U.S. decides to send forces to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan."
Doubts about the chain of command in China were heightened in the aftermath of the PLA's successful test of an antisatellite missile on Jan. 11 when most analysts concluded that top officials from the Foreign Ministry and civilian bureaucracy were clearly in the dark about the military's plan to shoot down an obsolete weather satellite.
Despite widespread protest from the international community, it took almost two weeks before the Foreign Ministry confirmed the test.
Other analysts point to an incident in October when one of China's newest conventional submarines approached the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and its battle group in international waters off Okinawa and was only detected when it surfaced near the American ships.
U.S. officials played down the incident, but some experts questioned whether China's civilian leadership would have sanctioned what could be seen as a highly provocative move.
For some analysts, both incidents could be interpreted as a clear demonstration for Washington of China's growing military capabilities and perhaps evidence that elements in the PLA leadership were less concerned about the diplomatic consequences than their civilian counterparts.
There is also evidence that some military officers enjoy far more leeway for criticizing or contradicting official policy in a country where dissent remains tightly controlled.
Major General Zhu Chenghu escaped serious censure, according to Chinese officials, after he said in July 2005 that China would respond with nuclear weapons if the United States intervened in a conflict over Taiwan.
Amid an international outcry over Zhu's remarks, top civilian bureaucrats were extremely reluctant to criticize him or even comment on his views.
Tolerance has also been extended to another senior officer and influential thinker, Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou, who has publicly called for political reform in China, a move that would be dangerous for most senior Chinese officials.
To some observers, it is to be expected that Hu lacks the authority that revolutionary leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping exerted over the military after establishing their credentials in resisting the Japanese invasion and then winning the civil war.
"Since Deng Xiaoping, no one has had that kind of control or legitimacy," said Yang.
When Hu succeeded former President Jiang Zemin in 2003 as leader of the state, party and military, most analysts speculated that it would take time for him to match his predecessors' hold over the armed forces and begin building his own power base.
There were signs that Hu is attempting to assert his authority through the promotion of loyal senior officers, a crackdown on corruption in the armed forces and the tough disciplinary action against senior officers held responsible for two accidents last year in which about 90 troops were killed.
Hu is also expected to use the 17th party congress expected to be held in October to promote more of his supporters in the military to top posts.
From speeches and reports in military newspapers and magazines, it also appears that Hu has been attempting to demonstrate his credentials as a military leader and thinker.
In these speeches, Hu has exhorted the military to accelerate preparations to fight high technology wars in an age where the use of information is crucial on the battlefield.
Analysts say that his references in these speeches to the military and political thinking of former leaders Mao, Deng and Jiang is an attempt to portray himself as part of a tradition that has directed the modernization of the PLA from a mass, peasant army to a modern, high technology force.
Under Hu, the military has continued to enjoy double-digit annual budget increases to pay for increasingly sophisticated weapons and improved lifestyles for senior officers.
Despite his background as an engineer and civilian bureaucrat, Hu wears an olive green style military tunic - although without badges or insignia - when meeting senior officers or attending parades and functions.
In what is seen by some analysts as an attempt to consolidate his control, Hu has ruled out suggestions from some younger officers that the Chinese military should become a fully professional force that owes its loyalty to the state rather than the ruling party.
In a speech to military delegates to China's annual parliamentary session in March, Hu called for tighter political discipline.
This view was reinforced in an April edition of the party magazine, Qiushi (Seeking Truth), where General Zhao Keming, the political commissar of China's National Defense University, wrote that the military must resist pressure to distance itself from politics.
"We must uphold the Chinese Communist Party's absolute leadership over the army from beginning to end," Zhao wrote.
By David Lague
Copyright by The International Herald Tribune
Published: June 22, 2007
BEIJING: As China converts its growing economic power into military muscle, a lack of transparency and a habit of secrecy pose formidable challenges in assessing the country's long-term ambitions, according to defense experts.
For foreign governments and analysts monitoring the Chinese military, one of the biggest mysteries is who is actually in charge.
Nominally, President Hu Jintao, who is also chairman of the Central Military Commission, the top military command body, is head of the armed forces, but there is considerable doubt among experts about the extent of the authority that he and his fellow civilian leaders exert over the 2.3 million-strong People's Liberation Army.
"I think Hu Jintao is still facing some challenges from top generals," said Philip Yang, an expert on the Chinese military and a professor of international relations at the National Taiwan University. "Especially those with their own agenda from the different services and others with their own agenda and perceptions about changes in the outside world, particularly in East Asia."
For China's neighbors and regional military powers, including the United States, this lack of knowledge about China's military decision-making is frustrating attempts to understand a buildup that could shift the balance of power in Asia.
Some of China's broad goals are clear from military publications, the speeches of senior leaders and the type and numbers of new weapons deployed.
The army's primary mission remains preserving the Communist Party's monopoly on power and protecting senior leaders.
In addition to defending Chinese territory, most Chinese and foreign analysts agree that Beijing aims to build a force capable of enforcing its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
But China's current thinking about when force is justified or what perceived threats are driving its accumulation of firepower remains unclear for most foreign governments and analysts.
Some foreign military analysts believe that there is now considerable debate under way in the Chinese military about the role of pre-emptive force in some circumstances including the use of nuclear weapons.
The Bush administration has repeatedly complained about this lack of transparency and called for increased military exchanges with Beijing.
"The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision making and key capabilities supporting China's military modernization," the Pentagon said in its annual report on China's military power released late last month. "China's leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired end-states of the PLA's expanding military capabilities."
Senior Chinese officials reject suggestions that a stronger army poses a threat to regional stability and insist that defense spending is strictly tailored to the country's needs.
Some influential Chinese analysts say that the PLA has made considerable strides in recent years in explaining its doctrine and spending plans, and they expect this trend to continue.
But they argue that Washington's military support for Taiwan makes it impossible for China to reveal more about its strategic thinking and force structure.
"We have to keep certain secrets in order to have a war-fighting capability," said Shen Dingli, a security expert at Fudan University in Shanghai. "We can't let Taiwan and the U.S. know how we are going to defeat them if the U.S. decides to send forces to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan."
Doubts about the chain of command in China were heightened in the aftermath of the PLA's successful test of an antisatellite missile on Jan. 11 when most analysts concluded that top officials from the Foreign Ministry and civilian bureaucracy were clearly in the dark about the military's plan to shoot down an obsolete weather satellite.
Despite widespread protest from the international community, it took almost two weeks before the Foreign Ministry confirmed the test.
Other analysts point to an incident in October when one of China's newest conventional submarines approached the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and its battle group in international waters off Okinawa and was only detected when it surfaced near the American ships.
U.S. officials played down the incident, but some experts questioned whether China's civilian leadership would have sanctioned what could be seen as a highly provocative move.
For some analysts, both incidents could be interpreted as a clear demonstration for Washington of China's growing military capabilities and perhaps evidence that elements in the PLA leadership were less concerned about the diplomatic consequences than their civilian counterparts.
There is also evidence that some military officers enjoy far more leeway for criticizing or contradicting official policy in a country where dissent remains tightly controlled.
Major General Zhu Chenghu escaped serious censure, according to Chinese officials, after he said in July 2005 that China would respond with nuclear weapons if the United States intervened in a conflict over Taiwan.
Amid an international outcry over Zhu's remarks, top civilian bureaucrats were extremely reluctant to criticize him or even comment on his views.
Tolerance has also been extended to another senior officer and influential thinker, Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou, who has publicly called for political reform in China, a move that would be dangerous for most senior Chinese officials.
To some observers, it is to be expected that Hu lacks the authority that revolutionary leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping exerted over the military after establishing their credentials in resisting the Japanese invasion and then winning the civil war.
"Since Deng Xiaoping, no one has had that kind of control or legitimacy," said Yang.
When Hu succeeded former President Jiang Zemin in 2003 as leader of the state, party and military, most analysts speculated that it would take time for him to match his predecessors' hold over the armed forces and begin building his own power base.
There were signs that Hu is attempting to assert his authority through the promotion of loyal senior officers, a crackdown on corruption in the armed forces and the tough disciplinary action against senior officers held responsible for two accidents last year in which about 90 troops were killed.
Hu is also expected to use the 17th party congress expected to be held in October to promote more of his supporters in the military to top posts.
From speeches and reports in military newspapers and magazines, it also appears that Hu has been attempting to demonstrate his credentials as a military leader and thinker.
In these speeches, Hu has exhorted the military to accelerate preparations to fight high technology wars in an age where the use of information is crucial on the battlefield.
Analysts say that his references in these speeches to the military and political thinking of former leaders Mao, Deng and Jiang is an attempt to portray himself as part of a tradition that has directed the modernization of the PLA from a mass, peasant army to a modern, high technology force.
Under Hu, the military has continued to enjoy double-digit annual budget increases to pay for increasingly sophisticated weapons and improved lifestyles for senior officers.
Despite his background as an engineer and civilian bureaucrat, Hu wears an olive green style military tunic - although without badges or insignia - when meeting senior officers or attending parades and functions.
In what is seen by some analysts as an attempt to consolidate his control, Hu has ruled out suggestions from some younger officers that the Chinese military should become a fully professional force that owes its loyalty to the state rather than the ruling party.
In a speech to military delegates to China's annual parliamentary session in March, Hu called for tighter political discipline.
This view was reinforced in an April edition of the party magazine, Qiushi (Seeking Truth), where General Zhao Keming, the political commissar of China's National Defense University, wrote that the military must resist pressure to distance itself from politics.
"We must uphold the Chinese Communist Party's absolute leadership over the army from beginning to end," Zhao wrote.
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