Test for Asia as Kim blows hole in Bush doctrine
Test for Asia as Kim blows hole in Bush doctrine
By Gideon Rachman
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
Published: October 9 2006 18:28 | Last updated: October 9 2006 18:28
“The United States of America will not allow the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most dangerous weapons.” That ringing proclamation by President George W. Bush lies at the heart of the “Bush doctrine”, which took America to war in Iraq. It was made in the president’s 2002 State of the Union address – the same speech in which he introduced the world to an “axis of evil” of three countries: Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
Almost five years on and the North Koreans’ apparently successful test of a nuclear weapon has delivered what may be a final blow to the Bush doctrine. In the name of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the US invaded Iraq – only to discover that it had no such weapons. But North Korea has successfully tested a nuclear weapon, in spite of the Bush doctrine. The third member of the “axis of evil”, Iran, is pressing ahead with its own nuclear programme – and seems likely to be greatly heartened by North Korean success.
In spite of American declarations that it will not tolerate North Korea’s nuclear programme, there seems little that the Bush administration can do in the short term. Tougher sanctions will be tried. It is difficult to persuade members of the nuclear weapons club to give up their nukes. Although the Bush administration will have to think about its military options, it seems highly unlikely that the Americans will launch military strikes, such as the bombing raids on North Korean missile-launch sites that some former Pentagon officials have suggested.
America needs its key allies in the region in this situation – and South Korea and Japan are likely to be deeply resistant to military action. More pragmatically, the Americans know that the limitations of North Korean missile technology mean that they are far less vulnerable to Kim Jong-il’s bombs than are North Korea’s immediate neighbours.
But if North Korea “gets away with it”, Iran is likely to draw some conclusions that are very unwelcome to the US. The first lesson is that if a country can only get across the nuclear finishing line, it becomes much less vulnerable to military strikes. The second is that the Bush administration’s talk of its implacable determination to prevent the spread of WMD to dangerous regimes is just that – talk.
Only last month – on the fifth anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 – Mr Bush reiterated his original pledge not to allow the world’s most dangerous regimes to get access to WMD. He quoted Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, the Iranian president, to illustrate the blood-curdling nature of the threat to the US. Indeed, it is the irrational and dictatorial nature of the current Iranian regime that lies at the heart of the case that is being made by those in Washington who are pressing for pre-emptive strikes against Iran.
Unfortunately, Mr Kim makes Mr Ahmadi-Nejad look like a model of sanity and lucidity. He has, on occasions, threatened to turn South Korea into a “sea of fire” and has even openly threatened to attack the US. It will be hard to make the case that it is too dangerous to tolerate an Iranian bomb if the US has already had to accept the reality of a nuclear North Korea.
Those American strategists who still want to go after Iran would probably respond that a nuclear Iran is potentially even more dangerous than a nuclear North Korea because the Iranians – backed by nuclear weapons and oil money – could turn themselves into an assertive regional superpower in a way that is just not imaginable for bankrupt, isolated North Korea. But that argument may be a little too sophisticated to save a Bush doctrine that was meant to be based on consistent, clear and easily understood principles.
The fact that the Bush administration has not come out of the North Korean debacle covered in glory does not mean that the other big players – China, Japan and South Korea – have done any better. On the contrary, South Korea’s “sunshine policy” now looks wildly over-optimistic. Chinese prestige has suffered from its inability to control its North Korean neighbour, in spite of the fact that the Kim regime is utterly dependent on supplies of food and oil from its giant neighbour.
But one positive side-effect of the crisis is that it may now cause a convergence of views and a new determination among the major powers that are trying to deal with North Korea. Mr Kim’s Asian neighbours seem likely to accept American urgings that the world should take a tougher line with North Korea. If the regional powers and the United Nations agree on a tough and unified response, that could yet send a useful lesson to Iran – that the game of divide-and-rule can only go so far.
The North Korean nuclear test could also foster an important diplomatic rapprochement that is already under way in east Asia. Shinzo Abe, the new Japanese prime minister, has just completed a visit to Beijing – the first such visit by a Japanese leader in five years. Mr Abe then went on to the South Korean capital, Seoul, to try to patch up relations there – which have also suffered badly because of disagreements over Japanese attitudes to the second world war.
If China, Japan and South Korea can now form a useful working relationship, they will collectively be much better placed to deal with North Korea. Since it is the countries of the region that are most directly threatened by a nuclear North Korea, it makes sense for them to take the lead in fashioning a response. The US should certainly welcome any such development. For one lesson of the failure of the Bush doctrine in the Middle East is that efforts to de-fang “rogue states” are immeasurably complicated if they do not enjoy regional support.
Ronald Reagan, former US president, is said to have told Mikhail Gorbachev, former Soviet leader, that the differences between the US and the Soviet Union would pale into insignificance if the two countries were jointly faced with a threat from Mars. Mr Kim is as close to a Martian as anyone in world politics. If his nuclear posturing provokes the big powers in east Asia to bury some of their differences and work together on making the region more secure, the North Korean dictator may ultimately have done the world a favour.
By Gideon Rachman
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
Published: October 9 2006 18:28 | Last updated: October 9 2006 18:28
“The United States of America will not allow the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most dangerous weapons.” That ringing proclamation by President George W. Bush lies at the heart of the “Bush doctrine”, which took America to war in Iraq. It was made in the president’s 2002 State of the Union address – the same speech in which he introduced the world to an “axis of evil” of three countries: Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
Almost five years on and the North Koreans’ apparently successful test of a nuclear weapon has delivered what may be a final blow to the Bush doctrine. In the name of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the US invaded Iraq – only to discover that it had no such weapons. But North Korea has successfully tested a nuclear weapon, in spite of the Bush doctrine. The third member of the “axis of evil”, Iran, is pressing ahead with its own nuclear programme – and seems likely to be greatly heartened by North Korean success.
In spite of American declarations that it will not tolerate North Korea’s nuclear programme, there seems little that the Bush administration can do in the short term. Tougher sanctions will be tried. It is difficult to persuade members of the nuclear weapons club to give up their nukes. Although the Bush administration will have to think about its military options, it seems highly unlikely that the Americans will launch military strikes, such as the bombing raids on North Korean missile-launch sites that some former Pentagon officials have suggested.
America needs its key allies in the region in this situation – and South Korea and Japan are likely to be deeply resistant to military action. More pragmatically, the Americans know that the limitations of North Korean missile technology mean that they are far less vulnerable to Kim Jong-il’s bombs than are North Korea’s immediate neighbours.
But if North Korea “gets away with it”, Iran is likely to draw some conclusions that are very unwelcome to the US. The first lesson is that if a country can only get across the nuclear finishing line, it becomes much less vulnerable to military strikes. The second is that the Bush administration’s talk of its implacable determination to prevent the spread of WMD to dangerous regimes is just that – talk.
Only last month – on the fifth anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 – Mr Bush reiterated his original pledge not to allow the world’s most dangerous regimes to get access to WMD. He quoted Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, the Iranian president, to illustrate the blood-curdling nature of the threat to the US. Indeed, it is the irrational and dictatorial nature of the current Iranian regime that lies at the heart of the case that is being made by those in Washington who are pressing for pre-emptive strikes against Iran.
Unfortunately, Mr Kim makes Mr Ahmadi-Nejad look like a model of sanity and lucidity. He has, on occasions, threatened to turn South Korea into a “sea of fire” and has even openly threatened to attack the US. It will be hard to make the case that it is too dangerous to tolerate an Iranian bomb if the US has already had to accept the reality of a nuclear North Korea.
Those American strategists who still want to go after Iran would probably respond that a nuclear Iran is potentially even more dangerous than a nuclear North Korea because the Iranians – backed by nuclear weapons and oil money – could turn themselves into an assertive regional superpower in a way that is just not imaginable for bankrupt, isolated North Korea. But that argument may be a little too sophisticated to save a Bush doctrine that was meant to be based on consistent, clear and easily understood principles.
The fact that the Bush administration has not come out of the North Korean debacle covered in glory does not mean that the other big players – China, Japan and South Korea – have done any better. On the contrary, South Korea’s “sunshine policy” now looks wildly over-optimistic. Chinese prestige has suffered from its inability to control its North Korean neighbour, in spite of the fact that the Kim regime is utterly dependent on supplies of food and oil from its giant neighbour.
But one positive side-effect of the crisis is that it may now cause a convergence of views and a new determination among the major powers that are trying to deal with North Korea. Mr Kim’s Asian neighbours seem likely to accept American urgings that the world should take a tougher line with North Korea. If the regional powers and the United Nations agree on a tough and unified response, that could yet send a useful lesson to Iran – that the game of divide-and-rule can only go so far.
The North Korean nuclear test could also foster an important diplomatic rapprochement that is already under way in east Asia. Shinzo Abe, the new Japanese prime minister, has just completed a visit to Beijing – the first such visit by a Japanese leader in five years. Mr Abe then went on to the South Korean capital, Seoul, to try to patch up relations there – which have also suffered badly because of disagreements over Japanese attitudes to the second world war.
If China, Japan and South Korea can now form a useful working relationship, they will collectively be much better placed to deal with North Korea. Since it is the countries of the region that are most directly threatened by a nuclear North Korea, it makes sense for them to take the lead in fashioning a response. The US should certainly welcome any such development. For one lesson of the failure of the Bush doctrine in the Middle East is that efforts to de-fang “rogue states” are immeasurably complicated if they do not enjoy regional support.
Ronald Reagan, former US president, is said to have told Mikhail Gorbachev, former Soviet leader, that the differences between the US and the Soviet Union would pale into insignificance if the two countries were jointly faced with a threat from Mars. Mr Kim is as close to a Martian as anyone in world politics. If his nuclear posturing provokes the big powers in east Asia to bury some of their differences and work together on making the region more secure, the North Korean dictator may ultimately have done the world a favour.
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