Missed opportunities, Gaza and the spread of jihadism
Missed opportunities, Gaza and the spread of jihadism
By Gideon Rachman
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
Published: June 19 2007 03:00 | Last updated: June 19 2007 03:00
"The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity." It is easy to understand why many Israelis are fond of that joke. It is not just that it is mildly funny, it also artfully absolves Israel itself of blame for the failure to achieve a lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. What are Israelis expected to do if the Palestinians are so hopeless and irresponsible?
This narrative of Palestinian fecklessness will only be bolstered by Hamas's seizure of power in the Gaza Strip. The Israelis can once again shrug and say that the Palestinians have missed an opportunity. Israel pulls out of Gaza in 2005 and what do the Palestinians do? They vote for Hamas, an Islamist party dedicated to Israel's destruction; lob missiles into Israel itself and then start killing each other.
Some Israelis may even see this latest missed opportunity as good news. The Palestinians look weaker and more divided than for years. They are tearing each other apart, rather than threatening Israel. Hamas is isolated and peace talks can be pursued with Fatah, a secular movement that accepts Israel's right to exist. Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister, says that the formation of a new Fatah-led Palestinian government on the West Bank creates "an opportunity that has not existed for a long time".
Mr Olmert can be forgiven for trying to look on the bright side. But it is hard to see Hamas's seizure of Gaza as anything but terrible news for all sides - Palestinians, Israelis and the Middle East in general. Israel now has a radicalised, anarchic, Iranian-backed statelet right on its borders. Splinter groups linked to al-Qaeda are already emerging in Gaza. Some Israelis are fretting that they have a new Somalia or Afghanistan on their border.
All this should make the Israelis reflect that it is not just the Palestinians who are capable of missing opportunities. The failure to achieve a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians in the 1990s looks increasingly like the moment when the last chance for a real two-state solution slipped away. The responsibility for this failure is the subject of endless recrimination. But the Israelis also played a direct role in the rise of Hamas. In the movement's early days, it almost certainly received covert Israeli support - as part of efforts to undermine the Palestine Liberation Organisation. More recently, Israeli border restrictions have helped strangle Gaza's economy.
The Israeli and American determination to boycott Hamas after the Palestinian elections of January 2006 also looks increasingly like a miscalculation. Of course Hamas - with a history of suicide bombing, Islamist militancy and links to Iran - is hardly an attractive partner. The organisation's brutality was on full display last week as it carried out executions on the streets of Gaza.
But Hamas is not a medieval militia like the Taliban or a purely terrorist organisation like al-Qaeda. It won
44 per cent of the vote in the 2006 elections - and had shown some signs of political evolution since then. It has stopped its sponsorship of suicide bombing. As part of a Saudi-sponsored agreement to join a unity government with Fatah last February, Hamas also accepted previous agreements made by the PLO - which implied a willingness to recognise Israel. Explicit recognition of Israel was always likely to be one of the last steps that Hamas made, rather than its opening gambit.
The western and Israeli boycott of Hamas was partly intended to demonstrate to the Palestinians the cost of supporting the Islamists. The hope was that they would turn against Hamas and back towards Fatah; or that Hamas itself would moderate its policies and recognise Israel. Instead Hamas has now routed Fatah in Gaza and an intensified dose of international isolation seems unlikely to persuade it of the benefits of moderation.
The fall of Gaza to Hamas also has to be seen in an international context in which Islamist radicals and jihadist movements are gaining ground around the world. In Lebanon, Hizbollah - another Iranian-backed militia - remains well entrenched, after the failure of the Israeli invasion last summer. The north of Lebanon has seen fighting provoked by the rise of Fatah al-Islam, which is inspired by al-Qaeda. Jihadist movements are also growing in strength in the Kurdish areas of Iraq and Turkey, in Jordan, Yemen, Egypt and across north Africa. Even south-east Asian countries - despite rapid economic growth - now have serious problems. Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines all have active and violent Islamist movements.
Above all, Iraq is serving as an inspiration and training ground for a new generation of jihadists - just as the Afghan war against the Soviet Union once did. Terrorist techniques perfected in Iraq are cropping up elsewhere. Suicide bombing was unknown in Afghanistan until a couple of years ago. Now it is a deadly, almost daily occurrence.
A familiar refrain - particularly in Europe - is that the key to soothing Islamist militancy lies in "solving" the Palestinian problem. There are obvious holes that can be picked in this argument. Osama bin Laden has never shown much interest in a two-state solution. The attacks of September 11 2001 were planned when the Middle East peace process was in relatively good shape. Al-Qaeda's demands are so unrealistic - and its narrative of grievance so selective - that it will not be swayed by any changes in western policy.
But Palestinian suffering undoubtedly swells the ranks of jihadist recruits. And having 1.4m desperate Palestinians locked into a lawless Gaza Strip, dominated by Islamists, is obviously a huge security risk for Israel itself.
Israel seems to have three basic options. It could reoccupy the Gaza Strip and help Fatah wage war on Hamas. It could effectively seal off the Gaza Strip and deal only with Fatah on the West Bank. Or it could support efforts to achieve Palestinian reconciliation and try to bring Hamas into a political process.
It seems most likely that Israel - backed by the US - will opt for isolation. For political, security and humanitarian reasons, that would be worse than a missed opportunity. It would be an escalation of a failed policy that has helped bring Gaza to disaster and increased the long-term threat to Israel.
By Gideon Rachman
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
Published: June 19 2007 03:00 | Last updated: June 19 2007 03:00
"The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity." It is easy to understand why many Israelis are fond of that joke. It is not just that it is mildly funny, it also artfully absolves Israel itself of blame for the failure to achieve a lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. What are Israelis expected to do if the Palestinians are so hopeless and irresponsible?
This narrative of Palestinian fecklessness will only be bolstered by Hamas's seizure of power in the Gaza Strip. The Israelis can once again shrug and say that the Palestinians have missed an opportunity. Israel pulls out of Gaza in 2005 and what do the Palestinians do? They vote for Hamas, an Islamist party dedicated to Israel's destruction; lob missiles into Israel itself and then start killing each other.
Some Israelis may even see this latest missed opportunity as good news. The Palestinians look weaker and more divided than for years. They are tearing each other apart, rather than threatening Israel. Hamas is isolated and peace talks can be pursued with Fatah, a secular movement that accepts Israel's right to exist. Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister, says that the formation of a new Fatah-led Palestinian government on the West Bank creates "an opportunity that has not existed for a long time".
Mr Olmert can be forgiven for trying to look on the bright side. But it is hard to see Hamas's seizure of Gaza as anything but terrible news for all sides - Palestinians, Israelis and the Middle East in general. Israel now has a radicalised, anarchic, Iranian-backed statelet right on its borders. Splinter groups linked to al-Qaeda are already emerging in Gaza. Some Israelis are fretting that they have a new Somalia or Afghanistan on their border.
All this should make the Israelis reflect that it is not just the Palestinians who are capable of missing opportunities. The failure to achieve a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians in the 1990s looks increasingly like the moment when the last chance for a real two-state solution slipped away. The responsibility for this failure is the subject of endless recrimination. But the Israelis also played a direct role in the rise of Hamas. In the movement's early days, it almost certainly received covert Israeli support - as part of efforts to undermine the Palestine Liberation Organisation. More recently, Israeli border restrictions have helped strangle Gaza's economy.
The Israeli and American determination to boycott Hamas after the Palestinian elections of January 2006 also looks increasingly like a miscalculation. Of course Hamas - with a history of suicide bombing, Islamist militancy and links to Iran - is hardly an attractive partner. The organisation's brutality was on full display last week as it carried out executions on the streets of Gaza.
But Hamas is not a medieval militia like the Taliban or a purely terrorist organisation like al-Qaeda. It won
44 per cent of the vote in the 2006 elections - and had shown some signs of political evolution since then. It has stopped its sponsorship of suicide bombing. As part of a Saudi-sponsored agreement to join a unity government with Fatah last February, Hamas also accepted previous agreements made by the PLO - which implied a willingness to recognise Israel. Explicit recognition of Israel was always likely to be one of the last steps that Hamas made, rather than its opening gambit.
The western and Israeli boycott of Hamas was partly intended to demonstrate to the Palestinians the cost of supporting the Islamists. The hope was that they would turn against Hamas and back towards Fatah; or that Hamas itself would moderate its policies and recognise Israel. Instead Hamas has now routed Fatah in Gaza and an intensified dose of international isolation seems unlikely to persuade it of the benefits of moderation.
The fall of Gaza to Hamas also has to be seen in an international context in which Islamist radicals and jihadist movements are gaining ground around the world. In Lebanon, Hizbollah - another Iranian-backed militia - remains well entrenched, after the failure of the Israeli invasion last summer. The north of Lebanon has seen fighting provoked by the rise of Fatah al-Islam, which is inspired by al-Qaeda. Jihadist movements are also growing in strength in the Kurdish areas of Iraq and Turkey, in Jordan, Yemen, Egypt and across north Africa. Even south-east Asian countries - despite rapid economic growth - now have serious problems. Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines all have active and violent Islamist movements.
Above all, Iraq is serving as an inspiration and training ground for a new generation of jihadists - just as the Afghan war against the Soviet Union once did. Terrorist techniques perfected in Iraq are cropping up elsewhere. Suicide bombing was unknown in Afghanistan until a couple of years ago. Now it is a deadly, almost daily occurrence.
A familiar refrain - particularly in Europe - is that the key to soothing Islamist militancy lies in "solving" the Palestinian problem. There are obvious holes that can be picked in this argument. Osama bin Laden has never shown much interest in a two-state solution. The attacks of September 11 2001 were planned when the Middle East peace process was in relatively good shape. Al-Qaeda's demands are so unrealistic - and its narrative of grievance so selective - that it will not be swayed by any changes in western policy.
But Palestinian suffering undoubtedly swells the ranks of jihadist recruits. And having 1.4m desperate Palestinians locked into a lawless Gaza Strip, dominated by Islamists, is obviously a huge security risk for Israel itself.
Israel seems to have three basic options. It could reoccupy the Gaza Strip and help Fatah wage war on Hamas. It could effectively seal off the Gaza Strip and deal only with Fatah on the West Bank. Or it could support efforts to achieve Palestinian reconciliation and try to bring Hamas into a political process.
It seems most likely that Israel - backed by the US - will opt for isolation. For political, security and humanitarian reasons, that would be worse than a missed opportunity. It would be an escalation of a failed policy that has helped bring Gaza to disaster and increased the long-term threat to Israel.
posted by Carlos T Mock @ 7:27 AM
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