Striking a new realism
By Dimitri K. Simes
Copyright by The International Herald Tribune
Published: May 17, 2007


Neither the Democratic takeover of Congress nor the beginning of the presidential campaign has yet started a meaningful foreign policy debate in the United States. In fact, setting aside Iraq, neither presidential candidates, Congress, nor the media have shown much interest in a serious conversation about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. And a majority of legislators and opinion leaders act as if Iraq were an isolated mistake resulting from the peculiar incompetence of the Bush administration rather than a logical consequence of the country's flawed post-Cold War foreign policy approach.

The problem is not new. When the United States became the only superpower, quite a few in the foreign policy elite could not withstand the temptation of triumphalism and a sense of unlimited possibilities. Near unanimity emerged between liberal interventionist Democrats and neoconservative Republicans, who together were able to dominate discourse on world affairs.

The American media's propensity to cover international relations through the prism of domestic politics helped to create the false sense of "Washington consensus." Those who have roles in previous administrations, connections to the current one, or a good chance to join the next one, enjoy the best access to op-ed pages and television.

The trouble is that while many of these people have impeccable academic credentials, few are analysts first and foremost. Many are members of a government-in-exile aspiring to return to power or work in businesses that depend on political connections. Such individuals naturally and understandably tend to be very careful to avoid defying the conventional wisdom; they are especially careful to avoid saying anything that could make them vulnerable to criticism.

Thus, in 2007, America has not yet had a serious debate about its role in the world in the 21st century. This is quite a contrast to the vigorous discussion of America's global mission at the end of World War II, which included lively exchanges on confronting the Soviet challenge, rebuilding Europe, moving Japan away from militarism, and creating a new structure of international organizations and regional alliances.

Today, beyond acknowledging that the United States is the only superpower with a unique mission and responsibilities, there is little assessment of the profound difference between America trying to play a global hegemon pressing mankind to take the direction it wants and, conversely, acting as a leader who genuinely strives to develop consensus positions reflecting not only its priorities, but also the interests and preferences of others.

While the choice is clearly not black and white, there is a choice. But do not expect to see much outside foreign policy journals.

Considerable evidence, for example, suggests that more even-handed U.S. management of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is essential to marginalize Islamic extremists. Yet presidential candidates are reluctant to offend Israel's supporters, and most members of Congress - from both parties - are running away from this explosive issue.

The conversation on Iran also has not gone beyond clichés like "no option should be off the table" and "dialogue might be a good idea." Most politicians, with the notable exceptions of Senators Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, and Chuck Hagel, Republican of Nebraska, fail even to acknowledge that the U.S. policy of regime change gives Tehran less incentive to accommodate American preferences.

There is also little public dialogue on the rise of China. On this the Bush administration is more pragmatic than many Democrats in Congress, who engage in populist, protectionist posturing. But no American leader is asking how the U.S. insistence on overwhelming military predominance - as important as it is - will affect China's views of its security requirements.

Finally, while there is bipartisan frustration with Russia's undemocratic trends at home and growing assertiveness abroad, most see a need to obtain its cooperation on matters like nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and support of Western positions in the UN Security Council. But many in the American political class still find it offensive to suggest that Washington may occasionally have to accommodate the Kremlin to secure this help.

For almost 20 years, it has been fashionable in the United States to assume that America could guide the world toward market democracy, that this would advance U.S. interests and the wishes of mankind alike, and that it would be cheap. A whole generation of politicians, opinion-makers and specialists has been brought up to believe that foreign policy realism is unnecessary and even immoral.

But this self-serving naïveté increasingly clashes with the pragmatic requirements of protecting U.S. security and enhancing American influence. Behind the facade of artificial consensus, more and more people in both parties are raising questions about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The question is whether their voices will become sufficiently loud and powerful before a new international crisis strikes.

Dimitri K. Simes, the president of The Nixon Center, is publisher of The National Interest. This article was adapted from an essay that appeared in that publication.