A Troubled 'Afghan Model' By Fareed Zakaria

A Troubled 'Afghan Model'
Having confronted Islamic extremists on many issues, Musharraf seems to believe he need not thwart them on the goal of Afghan jihad.
By Fareed Zakaria
© 2006 Newsweek, Inc.


Dec. 11, 2006 issue - As Iraq has descended into chaos over the last three years, Washington policymakers have often pointed to Afghanistan as the success story in the war on terror. Even those who worry about the situation on the ground agree that the United States and its NATO allies have the right strategy in place; they just think we've devoted too few resources to the problem. In fact, Afghanistan is in danger of becoming a version of Iraq, where the central government has collapsed, disorder is rife and a Qaeda-backed insurgency controls large swathes of the country. In addition, the policies that the United States has in place are at best inadequate. We have tried to handle Afghanistan with an Afghan strategy. But it is now clear that the only way to stabilize the country is to have a Pakistan strategy.

In a forthcoming article in Foreign Affairs, Barnett Rubin, a leading Afghanistan expert, reports after four visits this year that the country is "approaching a tipping point." (For the full text of the article, click here.) The Taliban-led insurgency is gaining ground. In some areas, parallel Taliban-run governments have their own courts and administrations. The insurgents now conduct suicide bombings—unprecedented in Afghanistan—and use improvised explosive devices like those in Iraq. In their southern strongholds, 35 percent of schools are closed. "As a result of the government's shaky legitimacy and weak powers," Rubin writes, "the international troop presence is coming to resemble a foreign occupation—and an occupation that Afghans will ultimately reject."

Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his counterpart in Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, have openly quarreled about the cause of the Taliban's re-emergence. Musharraf blames Karzai's incompetence and weakness. Karzai argues that Pakistan has been tacitly—and often actively—supporting the Taliban along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and in Pakistan itself. Having spoken to a number of senior Western officials and independent observers in both countries, I think it's clear that, in the words of a senior U.S. administration official who wished to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the subject, "the weight of the evidence supports President Karzai."

Americans want to believe that all good things go together. But here is a telling example of why that's not always true. President Musharraf is a genuine modernizer who has saved his country from becoming a failed state. Despite the compromises he has had to make, he has been more forward-looking on economics, law, religion and even women's rights issues than any government in Pakistan since the early 1970s. But having confronted Islamic extremists on such matters, Musharraf seems to believe that one area where he need not actively thwart them is in their goal of jihad against Karzai's government and its Western backers.

This attitude is part of a traditional Pakistani world view. The Islamabad strategic elite, which essentially means its top military officers, believes that establishing "strategic depth"—having some sway over events in Afghanistan—is crucial for Pakistan. This mechanistic view comes out of the cold war, when India and Afghanistan tilted toward the Soviet Union, and has gained ground as India and Afghanistan have both become pro-American. There are even those in Islamabad who believe that to counter these trends, Pakistan should help drive Western forces out of Afghanistan— even establish a pro-Pakistan, Taliban government in Kabul. That would explain Islamabad's constant refrain that the Taliban must be rehabilitated within the Afghan political system.

At the dinner that Bush threw for both presidents in September, Karzai was extremely blunt, according to those familiar with the discussions (who wish to remain anonymous because of the private nature of the event). Karzai warned that if the United States was forced to leave Afghanistan, Kabul would ally far more closely with India and Russia, which would not be in Pakistan's interests. He also urged Musharraf to recognize that in supporting the Taliban and its doctrine of ethnic Pashtun nationalism, Musharraf was creating a problem for himself since there are millions of dissatisfied Pashtuns within Pakistan.

The United States and its NATO allies should push Musharraf to recognize that what Pakistan needs right now is not strategic depth but stability. Its economy is on a roll thanks to a strong reform program established and overseen by its savvy prime minister, Shaukat Aziz. With India and Pakistan growing at 8 percent a year, the Subcontinent could move into a win-win world in which peace and prosperity reinforce each other in an upward spiral of success. South Asia could then look a whole lot more like Southeast Asia, a region where economic growth has alleviated historical tensions and border disputes.

For the United States, too, there is an upside to success but, more important, a real downside to failure. If Washington is not able to persuade President Musharraf to crack down on the Taliban, it will inevitably mean the renewal of Al Qaeda, the only organization that has launched terror attacks across the globe directed at America and Americans. That's not just a problem for the United States' credibility. It is a problem for the safety and security of its citizens.