Bush made evil-doers into an axis

Bush made evil-doers into an axis
By Jacob Weisberg
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
Published: October 11 2006 18:41 | Last updated: October 11 2006 18:41



In his first State of the Union address in January 2002, George W. Bush offered up the expression “axis of evil” to describe the governments of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Critics jumped on the US president for his belligerent rhetoric. But the problem with Mr Bush’s formulation was not his use of the term “evil”, an apt description of the regimes of Saddam Hussein, the Iranian mullahs and Kim Jong-il. The real issue was with the “axis” part. With his reference to the axis powers of the second world war, Mr Bush suggested some sort of alliance among them. His turn of phrase indicated a unitary problem and implied that, in taking on one, America would be dealing with all three.

Nearly five years later, we can see the damage caused by the president’s too-cute slogan and the muddled thinking behind it. By failing to distinguish clearly among the overlapping threats presented by rogue states, nuclear proliferators and supporters of terrorism, Mr Bush helped bring his own nightmare to life. Thanks to his foreign policy, many of the world’s dictators now function as a kind of anti-American co-operative, in a way they did not when he made that speech.

Let us look back at the members circa 2002. Although they shared an interest in proliferation and were all brutal violators of human rights, the regimes in Iraq, Iran and North Korea posed distinct and very different problems. The Ba’ath in Iraq was shooting at American planes in the no-fly zone and defying the international community over inspections. But, as we now know, they were not big sponsors of terrorism and were nowhere near building, buying or giving nukes to others. The theocrats in Iran, on the other hand, had a long history of backing terrorism and presented a long-term proliferation threat. North Korea’s Stalinists were stroking their fuel rods and menacing the South as usual, but not supporting terrorism. All three regimes were hostile to the US, but not in any synchronised way.

Now consider the axis today. The coalition attack on Iraq prompted Muammer Gadaffi, a Little Brother of Evil, to put up his hands and renounce nuclear weapons. But Iran and North Korea drew from Mr Bush’s idealist invasion the realist lesson that only a nuclear deterrent could preserve them from regime change. Mr Kim, in particular, seems to have taken the point that the American war machine could instantly pulverise his tanks and missiles massed along the demilitarised zone. This meant he needed to accelerate his try-out of the Pacific-spanning Taepodong-2 missile and cram for the nuclear test. Mr Bush’s adamant policy of non-discussion made matters worse, ensuring that neither country could be induced to slow down or back away from its nuclear rush. He might as well have announced a prize for the first successful detonation.

But the president’s biggest act of axis-enhancement was tying up the American military in Iraq and antagonising America’s allies. While the global cop was busy in Baghdad, the world’s other worst villains staged a jailbreak. They understood that
Mr Bush could not readily respond to their provocations with force. The opportunity cost of occupying Iraq has also been felt in Syria and Sudan, among the other places where evil has gone unchecked for want of effective American leadership. At another level, Mr Bush’s unpopularity has spurred an informal new anti-American International, with Hugo Chávez, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad and George Galloway running for secretary-general.

The administration’s discredited claims about Iraqi weapons have further served Iran and North Korea by casting Mr Bush as The Boy Who Cried WMD. Though there has never been much doubt about their nuclear ambitions, propagandists for those regimes have found it all too easy to call the president’s credibility on the subject into question and to create a shadow of doubt. Meanwhile, Mr Bush’s unilateralism fractured an international community that might otherwise be much more unified in its present response.

Mr Bush’s policies have strengthened Iran and North Korea in more specific ways, too. After deposing the Taliban, an unfriendly Sunni power to Iran’s east, the American military knocked off Saddam, Iran’s enemy to the west. This gave the mullahs an irresistible opportunity to aim for regional hegemony by fostering the development of a greater Shiastan stretching from Hazaristan in Afghanistan to Basra in Iraq to southern Lebanon, via the Syrian land bridge. Occupying Iraq also presented Iran with a nearby American target and an easy opportunity for retaliation in case of nuclear pre-emption. The same might be said of the 30,000 US troops garrisoned in Korea. Former US president Bill Clinton’s policy of bribing Mr Kim to not proliferate was not pretty and it helped prop up his bankrupt regime. But Mr Clinton’s emphasis on negotiation postponed the day when the Dear Leader could menace the world with an atomic bomb.

Mr Bush’s obstinacy and belligerence did not create the predicaments we now face in Iran and North Korea. But his approach has brought nearer threats that a different set of policies might have deferred or avoided entirely, while ushering in a new co-operative dynamic among America’s enemies. Thank you, Mr President, for giving us the axis of evil.

The writer is editor of Slate.com